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ABSTRACT
Firms going public have increasingly been incorporating antitakeover provisions in their IPO
charters, while shareholders of existing companies have increasingly been voting in opposition to
such charter provisions. This paper identifies possible explanations for this empirical pattern.
Specifically, I analyze explanations based on (1) the role of antitakeover arrangements in
encouraging founders to break up their initial control blocks, (2) efficient private benefits of control,
(3) agency problems among pre-IPO shareholders, (4) agency problems between pre-IPO
shareholders and their IPO lawyers, (5) asymmetric information between founders and public
investors about the firm's future growth prospects, and (6) bounded attention and imperfect pricing










Strong antitakeover defenses are common among publicly traded firms.  Why 
do firms adopt such arrangements? Does the adoption of such arrangements 
indicate that board veto over takeovers is beneficial to share value?  What explains 
the fact that at the IPO stage firms adopt strong takeover provisions, such as 
effective staggered boards, that shareholders systematically reject midstream?  To 
what extent should corporate law place limits on a firm’s choice of antitakeover 
arrangements?  This paper seeks to address each of these questions. 
Firms opt for antitakeover protection in two main ways, both of which have 
attracted some attention. First, firms adopt antitakeover charter provisions.  Recent 
work has documented that in the last decade, firms that have gone public have 
increasingly been incorporating such provisions in their charters.1  Second, firms 
incorporate in states that have statutes or case law that make takeovers difficult. 
Recent evidence indicates that states with more antitakeover statutes are more 
successful in attracting incorporations. 2   
Supporters of board veto have argued that the adoption of antitakeover 
arrangements at the IPO stage provides “market proof” that board veto is desirable 
for shareholders.3  Their inference is unwarranted, however, because the evidence 
about shareholder preferences for antitakeover protections are, to say the least, 
rather mixed.  While the adoption of antitakeover protections at the IPO stage has 
                                                 
1 see John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1301 (2001); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. Econ. & Org. 83 (2001); Laura Casares Field & Jonathan 
M. Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, 57 J. Fin. 1857, 1858 (2002). 
2 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law, 90 
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(2002); Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do Better than the States in Regulating 
Takeovers?, 57 Bus. Law. 1025 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder 
Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 845, 847-56 (2002); John Elofson, 
What If They Gave a Shareholder Revolution and Nobody Came? Poison Pills, Binding Shareholder 
Resolutions and the Coase Theorem (working paper 2002).    2
increased over the last decade, shareholder opposition to antitakeover protections 
through voting decisions has increased as well.4  In the wake of this seemingly 
contradictory evidence, a theory is needed that is sufficiently rich to account for the 
behavior of firms and investors, both at the IPO stage and in midstream.5 
I identify and work out below several possible explanations that can account 
for both IPO and midstream behavior.6  First, under the explanation of encouraging 
de-concentration of ownership, antitakeover provisions serve the interests of 
shareholders when firms go public. In the absence of such arrangements, founders 
would be discouraged from subsequently reducing their holdings and relinquishing 
the lock on control that comes with concentrated ownership. Under this explanation, 
while public investors would fare best under dispersed ownership with weak 
antitakeover provisions, having strong antitakeover provisions in the IPO charter is 
still preferable because it results in less entrenchment.  Thus, antitakeover 
provisions are desirable at the IPO stage only because they encourage founders to 
break up their control blocks.  Then, once ownership is sufficiently dispersed so that 
the votes of public investors matter, the benefits of antitakeover protections 
disappear.  This can explain the midstream opposition of such investors to 
antitakeover arrangements. 
Under the efficient rent protection theory, antitakeover arrangements are 
always undesirable for public investors and reduce the value of their shares.   
However, the benefits of rent protection obtained by the founders through the 
antitakeover provisions are, at least at the IPO stage, greater than the resultant 
reduction in share price that the provisions cause.  In this case, antitakeover 
arrangements are efficient overall; thus, assuming no informational problems, 
founders find it in their interest to adopt them at the IPO stage even though this 
                                                 
4 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect 
Managers from Takeovers, 99 Col. L. Rev. 1168, 1187 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, 
Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice, 87 Va. L. Rev. 993, 999-1001 (2001).  
5 Michael Klausner, in Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Anti-takeover Protection at the 
IPO Stage, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2003), also stresses the conflicting patterns of IPO and 
midstream behavior and the need to reconcile them. His analysis focuses on the firms with 
private equity funding, where some of the institutional investors regularly voting against 
antitakeover provisions are also investors in the private equity funds taking public firms with 
such provisions.   
6 As I will note, some of the suggested explanations are new, while others build on earlier works 
written by myself and by others. For all explanations, my analysis seeks to contribute by 
working out fully the explanation, examining the extent to which it can explain empirical 
patterns, and drawing its implications for legal policy.    3
reduces the price they can get for their shares.  At the midstream stage, however, 
shareholders have every reason to vote against a proposed antitakeover 
arrangement unless they receive appropriate compensation for the resulting 
reduction in the value of their shares.  Similarly, if they could undo the antitakeover 
arrangement, shareholders would likely vote to do so in midstream.  
Under agency cost explanations, antitakeover arrangements may be adopted 
even though they are inefficient.  That is, the cost to the pre-IPO shareholders from 
reduced IPO revenues caused by such arrangements is smaller than the rent 
protection benefits they would receive.  And, given that antitakeover provisions 
reduce share value, shareholders can be expected to vote against such arrangements 
in midstream.  The question remains, however, as to why pre-IPO shareholders 
adopt such arrangements.  The answer given is that agency problems on the side of 
the pre-IPO shareholders lead them to adopt inefficient charter provisions.  
One type of agency problem is an agency problem among IPO shareholders.  
Here, when only some of the pre-IPO shareholders will continue to run the firm 
after the IPO, these founder-managers might have an incentive to include 
antitakeover arrangements in the charter.  After all, they will fully capture the 
benefits of rent protection, and will bear only part of the cost of reduced IPO share 
price. 
Another type of agency problem is an agency problem between lawyers and 
pre-IPO shareholders.  To the extent that lawyers’ expertise gives them influence 
over decision-making, they might have an incentive to tilt their recommendations in 
favor of antitakeover arrangements.  The downside of not having antitakeover 
protection--that incumbents might find themselves unprotected from a hostile bid 
down the road--might be attributed to the lawyers and might negatively affect their 
reputation.  Furthermore, the potential upside of not including antitakeover 
provisions--a slightly higher IPO share price--would hardly be credited to the 
lawyers’ work.  As such, since the adoption of antitakeover provisions provides a 
benefit to lawyers and no cost to them, they have an incentive to use their influence 
over the drafting of the charter to encourage antitakeover arrangements, even 
though these arrangements are inefficient for both founders and shareholders. 
Under the asymmetric information theory, public investors are assumed to 
have perfect information about the effect of the provision given any value of the 
company’s assets, but to have imperfect information about the value of these assets.  
In such a case, assuming that higher asset value is associated with higher expected 
benefits from rent protection, some or all founders will have an incentive to signal a 
high asset value by adopting antitakeover arrangements.  Although shareholders 
know that antitakeover arrangements are inefficient and will reduce the share price   4
at the IPO stage accordingly, the increase in share price as a result of the information 
conveyed concerning asset value outweighs this negative antitakeover effect.  Thus, 
this signaling effect may provide founders with an incentive to adopt inefficient 
antitakeover provisions at the IPO stage.  Shareholders, however, will oppose such 
inefficient protections in midstream. 
Last, but not least, under the bounded attention theory, investors at the IPO 
stage do not bother to price antitakeover arrangements that fall within a certain set 
of conventional arrangements.  The exact location of the firm’s choice within this set 
is viewed as relatively less important than the other uncertainties involved in 
valuing a closely held company that is going public.  Without the aid of prior 
market pricing and exposure to market analysis, the level of uncertainty about the 
value of the company’s assets and management is relatively high.  Furthermore, the 
consequences of the chosen antitakeover arrangement would have the most impact 
down the road after shares become more dispersed.  As a result, even if investors 
view some antitakeover arrangements as theoretically inefficient, they might not 
bother to factor them into the price they are willing to pay for IPO shares.   
In contrast, down the road at the midstream stage, questions concerning 
antitakeover arrangements will come to a vote in circumstances that make investors 
focus on the issue in isolation from others and that make the issue practically 
important.  At this point, the inefficiency of antitakeover arrangements will lead 
shareholders to vote against them. 
In addition to identifying several potentially plausible explanations for 
observed IPO and midstream patterns, I also discuss why some other potential 
explanations, including ones put forward by Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock, Lynn 
Stout, and Michael Klausner, cannot account for these patterns. I thus attempt to 
provide a comprehensive review of the factors that contribute to producing the 
observed patterns of behavior.  
The analysis of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the 
conflicting evidence of shareholder preference for antitakeover provisions.  Section 
II then develops and analyzes alternative explanations for the difference in behavior 
between the IPO and midstream stages. Section III concludes.  
   5
I. THE OPTIMALITY INFERENCE AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS 
 
A. The Debate Over Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers 
  
There are reasons to believe that strong antitakeover protections decrease 
share value, and I review them in detail elsewhere.7  Ex post--that is, once a bid is on 
the table--incumbents can use their veto power to block an acquisition that would be 
beneficial to shareholders.  The evidence indicates that incumbents armed with a 
staggered board are much more likely to retain independence in the face of a hostile 
bid, and that the decision to remain independent commonly makes shareholders 
worse off.8 
Furthermore, ex ante, having a board veto reduces the disciplinary force that 
the takeover threat can exert on incumbents.  The evidence indicates that, when 
managers are protected from takeovers by strong antitakeover statutes or by 
antitakeover provisions, managerial slack increases.9  When managers have less to 
fear from takeovers they fail to reduce costs and have poorer operating 
performance, including lower profit margins, return on equity, and sales growth. 
Are there any potential benefits of board veto that outweigh the above costs 
of it? Supporters of board veto argue that that, even if incumbents might abuse their 
veto power in hostile bid cases, they are likely to use it to benefit shareholders by 
raising premia in negotiated transactions.10  As I explain in detail elsewhere, 
however, there are good theoretical reasons to doubt the presence, or at least the 
significance, of the bargaining advantage that a board veto is claimed to have.11 In a 
preliminary empirical study of this question, Coates, Subramanian, and I indeed 
found no statistically significant effect of staggered boards on premia in negotiated 
                                                 
7 See Lucian Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973 
(2002).  
8 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, 
and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887 (2002).  
9 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullinathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using 
Takeover Legislation, 30 Rand J. Econ. 535 (1999); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, Capital 
Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54 J. Fin. 519 
(1999); Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Q. J. E. 107, 129 (2003).  
10 See, e.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 
824-25 (2002). 
11 See Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1007-1013.   6
acquisitions.12  Furthermore, two recent studies find evidence that managers are 
willing to trade off premia for personal gains in the wake of a takeover,13 which 
further reinforces doubts that giving managers more bargaining power would result 
in more value to shareholders.   
Proponents of board veto have also argued that it might have beneficial 
effects ex ante.  They suggest that board veto can encourage long-range investment 
and prevent managerial myopia.14  They also claim that board veto can encourage 
firm-specific investments by managers (and other employees).15 As I explain 
elsewhere, however, there is currently no empirical support for the view that these 
conjectured effects are sufficiently significant to outweigh the adverse ex ante effects 
of board veto.16   
A current study by Alma Cohen and myself investigates empirically the 
overall effect that board veto has on shareholder value.17 We find that staggered 
boards established by company charters are associated with a lower market value, 
with a median reduction of about 5% of market value. We also find evidence 
consistent with charter-based staggered boards causing, and not merely reflecting, a 
lower firm value. This evidence provides support for the view that board view has 
overall an adverse effect on shareholders.  
Thus, in terms of direct evidence about the effects of board veto, supporters of 
board veto have no favorable empirical evidence to reply on and confront a 
significant body of unfavorable empirical evidence. It is thus unsurprising that 
proponents of board veto now so much welcome and try to rely on certain indirect 
                                                 
12 Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply 
to Symposium Participants, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885 (2002).  
13 See Jay Hartzell et al., What's in It for Me?: Personal Benefits Obtained by CEO's Whose Firms Are 
Acquired 5 (2003) (New York University Stern School of Business working paper), at 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~eofek/papers.htm (last visited Sep. 7, 2003); JulieWulf, Do CEOs 
in Mergers Trade Power for Premium?: Evidence from "Mergers of Equals" (working paper, at 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/PDFs/1009.pdf). 
14 See e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Business Lawyer 101, 
115-16 (1979); Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: 
The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 University of Chicago Law Review 187, 205-14 
(1991).  
15  See, e.g., Lynn  Stout and Margaret Blair, 85 Virginia Law Review 247, 304-05 (1999). 
16 See Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1011-13. 
17 See Alma Cohen and Lucian Bebchuk, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, working paper, 
Harvard Law School, October 2003.   7
evidence -- the evidence that companies adopt antitakeover provisions at the IPO 
stage. 
 
B. IPO Behavior and Optimality 
 
Although state corporate law has, for the most part, sanctioned the various 
elements of board veto, it has by no means mandated these elements.  Corporate 
charters could seek to tie management’s hands from blocking offers by restricting 
board power to use poison pills.  Alternatively, corporate charters could provide 
arrangements that reinforce the pill by making it more difficult for a hostile bidder 
to replace the board with a team that would redeem the pill.  Recent empirical 
evidence that has attracted much attention indicates that firms going public during 
the past decade have designed their charters to support, rather than eliminate, board 
veto.18  
To begin, while state law universally recognizes the validity of the poison pill, 
charters routinely authorize the use of blank check preferred stock that is used for 
creating poison pills.  This practice is not surprising, however, for the poison pill by 
itself does not result in board veto and is probably not, on its own, value-decreasing.  
The poison pill still allows shareholders to decide whether to authorize the takeover; 
it merely forces them to express their preferences through a vote on replacing the 
directors.   
Although the ability to force a shareholder vote through the poison pill is not 
by itself value-decreasing, there are other antitakeover protections--those that 
substantially impede the ability of shareholders to replace the board quickly--that 
can provide management with substantial veto power.  In particular, the 
combination of the poison pill and an effective staggered board provides 
management with considerable veto power.  Unlike the poison pill, which can be 
adopted at any time by the board and does not require shareholder approval, 
staggered boards usually require a charter provision.  
Empirical evidence suggests that IPO firms opted for staggered boards and 
other antitakeover provisions at an increasing rate throughout the 1990s.  For 
instance, in his comprehensive study of IPO charter provisions, Coates found that 
only thirty-four percent of firms adopted staggered boards at the IPO stage in 1991-
92.  By 1998, that number had risen to sixty-six percent, and by 1999 the number rose 
again to eight-two percent of firms.19    
                                                 
18 See sources cited supra note 1. 
19 Coates, supra note 1, at 1376.   8
According to a widely held view, firms at the IPO stage have powerful 
incentives to adopt arrangements that benefit shareholders,20 and the adoption of 
arrangements at this stage thus provides evidence of their optimality.  Applying this 
general view to the takeover context, supporters of board veto argue that this 
pattern was due to—-and thus was evidence of—-the positive effects of board veto 
on share value.21  According to this view, the IPO evidence indicates that 
shareholders–-who are in the best position to know their interests–-wish to 
implement board veto. The existing direct evidence concerning the adverse effects of 
board veto, it is argued, should take a back seat to the clear expression of 
shareholder preferences that IPO charters provide. 
 
C. Conflicting Midstream Behavior 
 
The evidence with respect to shareholders’ preferences, however, is much 
more mixed than supporters of board veto would like to believe.  Indeed, while IPO 
charter provisions are argued to enable an inference of shareholder preferences, 
shareholders have been expressing their preferences directly and clearly in their 
voting decisions.  
Throughout the past decade, shareholders of existing companies have been 
generally unwilling to vote in favor of amending the charter to include antitakeover 
provisions that would make replacement of the board more difficult.  In the wake of 
this dwindling shareholder support, boards have all but stopped proposing such 
amendments.  From 1986 to 2000, the annual number of such proposals dropped by 
ninety percent.22  
Furthermore, shareholders’ opposition to antitakeover charter provisions has 
been reflected in the large and growing support given to precatory resolutions to 
dismantle existing staggered boards.23  For instance, Patrick McGurn, Special 
Counsel for Institutional Shareholder Services, has stated: 
In the wake of the corporate scandals of the past several months, ISS often 
receives inquiries as to our views on the two or three key governance changes that—
-if adopted by all issuers—-would help investors to avoid similar market meltdowns 
                                                 
20   See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). 
21 See sources cited supra note 3. 
22 See Klausner, supra note 3, at 6-7.  
23 See Georgeson Shareholder, Annual Corporate Governance Review: Shareholder Proposals 
and Proxy Contests 6 (2002).   9
in the future. Unquestionably, the item on our wish list that draws the blankest 
stares from corporate America is the call for annual elections of all members of 
corporate boards.24 
McGurn goes on to note that over the last three years, precatory resolutions to 
repeal staggered boards have, on average, received support from a majority of the 
shareholders participating in the vote.25  The evidence shows that this support is 
strong and has been increasing over the last decade.  
That these proposals have been able to gain a majority is particularly striking 
due to the tendency of shareholders to side with the board in votes on precatory 
resolutions. Many other such resolutions, even those that are potentially beneficial 
for shareholders, receive little institutional support.26  But on the issue of staggered 
boards, the institutional shareholders speak loudly, persistently, and with a clear 
voice.  This pattern provides very strong evidence that shareholders do not favor 
charter provisions that facilitate board veto.  
 
D. Attempting to Reconcile IPO and Midstream Behavior 
 
Can supporters of board veto reconcile the shareholder voting evidence with 
their claim that shareholders often prefer a board veto?  Marcel Kahan an Ed Rock 
raise the possibility that it may take time for shareholders to learn about the precise 
effects of board veto on share value.27  According to this view, shareholder voting 
against takeover defenses is a transient phenomenon that will gradually go away as 
all shareholders learn to recognize the beneficial effects of such defenses.  
This explanation, however, is undermined by an examination of the trends 
over time.  During the 1990s, the incidence of antitakeover provisions in IPO 
charters has been increasing, as has the percentage of shareholders voting in 
opposition to staggered boards.  Under the learning conjecture, learning should 
gradually lead to convergence of IPO and midstream behavior; but, in fact, we have 
seen the opposite.  As players’ experience with antitakeover provisions has 
increased, both the IPO adoption and the midstream opposition have become more 
pronounced.  
                                                 
24 Patrick S. McGurn, Classification Cancels Corporate Accountability, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 839, 839 
(2002).   
25 Id. at 840-41. 
26 See Georgeson Shareholder, Annual Corporate Governance Review: Shareholder Proposals 
and Proxy Contests.  
27 See Kahan and Rock, supra note 3, at 8-9.   10
Kahan and Rock also suggest that strong antitakeover protections are 
beneficial for some companies but not for others.28  According to this view, IPO 
adoption of antitakeover arrangements is limited to companies of the former type 
that go public, while midstream opposition to such arrangements occurs in firms of 
the latter type.  This heterogeneity-based explanation, however, is also undermined 
by the evidence.  
For one thing, IPO adoption of antitakeover arrangements has become 
practically universal rather than limited to certain types of companies.  The 
incidence of staggered board adoption at the IPO stage has been increasing 
considerably and now exceeds eighty percent.29  At the same time, shareholders’ 
midstream opposition to staggered boards is also practically universal rather than 
limited to some types of companies.  To be sure, precatory resolutions to dismantle 
staggered boards--which are non-binding anyway--occur in only a limited fraction 
of companies. In many companies that do not have a staggered board, management 
would have been happy to get a charter provision establishing a staggered board if 
it could, but it cannot do so because of shareholders’ unwillingness to approve such 
charter amendments.   
Could one argue that existing companies without a staggered board are of a 
type for which a staggered board is not beneficial, rather than of a type for which a 
staggered board is beneficial?  That would be implausible because the selection of 
existing companies that do not have staggered boards does not reflect their current 
type. Most publicly traded companies went public prior to 1990, and since 1990 
companies that did not already have a staggered board have been unable to get 
shareholders to approve the adoption of a staggered board.  The absence of 
staggered boards in existing pre-1990 companies reflects at most their pre-1990 type 
rather than their current type. The inability of such companies to obtain shareholder 
support for a charter amendment establishing a staggered board thus indicates that 
shareholder opposition to midstream adoption of such an amendment is universal 
rather than specific to some types of companies. 
Lynn Stout argues against inferring from shareholders’ voting decisions that 
shareholders do not benefit from antitakeover arrangements.30 On her view, such 
arrangements benefit shareholders by encouraging managers (and other employees) 
                                                 
28 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3. 
29 See SharkRepellent.Net, IPO year in Review 2002, available at www.sharkrepellent.net.  
30 Lynn Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public 
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, University of Pennsylvania Law Review _ (2003), 
manuscript at 37-40.   11
to make firm-specific investments in human capital, and IPO firms adopt them for 
this reason. Once shareholders derive some benefits from managers’ making such 
sunk-cost investments, she argues, they may be tempted sometimes to try to remove 
takeover defenses. But this argument cannot explain why the large fraction of 
existing firms that did not have a staggered board in 1990 have generally been 
unable since 1990 to persuade shareholders to add such a defense. If the 
shareholders of IPO firms generally benefit from takeover defenses that will 
encourage firm-specific investments in the years following the IPO, we should also 
expect that the shareholders of many existing companies will also benefit from 
adopting defenses that will encourage firm-specific investments in the years 
following the adoption. But shareholders of existing firms have generally been 
unwilling to vote in favor of adding such defenses.  
I conclude that it is not possible to accept the simple Panglossian theory that 
the common adoption of antitakeover provisions in IPO charters indicates that 
shareholders prefer to have such arrangements.  The view that IPO charters simply 
seek to satisfy shareholders’ wishes to have companies governed by antitakeover 
provisions is inconsistent with shareholders’ midstream strong and persistent 
opposition to such provisions. What is needed, then, is a richer account that can 
explain both IPO and midstream behavior.  Investigating what such an account 
might be is the task of the next section, which identifies several explanations for the 
complex empirical reality that we observe. 
 
II. EXPLAINING IPO AND MIDSTREAM BEHAVIOR 
 
A. A Simple Model 
 
In order to explore the incentive effects facing firms and shareholders--both at 
the IPO stage and midstream--it is helpful to consider a paradigmatic, stylized 
model.  This model will be useful for analyzing the various possible theoretical 
explanations for the empirical data described above--namely the efficiency theory, 
the agency cost theory, and the signaling theory.   
The model contains three different time periods. In the first period, T0, the 
founders of a company are taking the company public.  The founders have decided 
to sell only a fraction, α, of their shares.  I assume that, as is common in IPOs, the 
fraction α amounts to a minority of the shares, so that immediately after the IPO the 
pre-IPO shareholders still hold a majority of the shares.  The founder-manager   12
running the firm prior to the IPO is expected to continue running the firm after the 
IPO.   
When the founders take the company public, they must also choose whether 
to incorporate antitakeover charter provisions in the IPO charter.  For simplicity, I 
will assume that the choice made is between an arrangement, BV, under which the 
board has veto power over takeover bids, and an arrangement, No-BV, under which 
the board will not have such veto power.  Because this choice might affect the value 
of public investors’ shares in the event that the company moves to dispersed 
ownership down the road, this choice might also affect the price paid for shares at 
the IPO.  Let P denote the price that public investors are willing to pay for the 
fraction α of the shares under a No-BV arrangement, and let P + ∆P denote the price 
they would be willing to pay for the shares under a BV arrangement.  
In the second period, T1, there is a probability, θ, that the manager of the firm 
will face a profitable investment opportunity.  To finance such an expansion, the 
firm would need to raise an amount, K, in a secondary offering of shares.  The 
investment would produce a value of K + ∆K (where ∆K is positive).  It is assumed 
that the amount needed is sufficiently large that, if the expansion is pursued, the 
founders would no longer have a majority of the votes and thus would not have a 
lock on control.  This would make the initial choice between BV and No-BV relevant.  
Such a development will be referred to as “a move to dispersed ownership.” 
In the third period, T2, the company operates its business. If the company did 
not expand in T1, the company will produce a cash flow of V for its shareholders 
and a private benefit of B for its manager.  If the company did expand and move to 
dispersed ownership, the values captured by the shareholders and the manager will 
depend on whether BV or No-BV was initially chosen.  
If the company adopted a BV arrangement at the IPO, the manager will be 
able to continue to enjoy a private benefit of B even though the company is now in 
dispersed ownership.  In contrast, under No-BV and dispersed ownership, the 
manager will be able to enjoy only a lower level of private benefits, B - ∆B.  Thus, ∆B 
is the positive effect on private benefits that antitakeover protection provides.  This 
effect is comprised of the security of getting the private benefits of office, or the extra 
benefits that the manager would be able to extract without fear of a takeover. 
With regard to cash flow, under a BV arrangement the cash flow captured by 
shareholders will be V + K + ∆ K.  In this case, even though private benefits are 
assumed not to decline, cash flow will increase because of the expansion.  A No-BV 
arrangement, which would reduce private benefit by ∆B, would increase cash flows 
by ∆V.  While we have every reason to assume that ∆B is positive–-that not having   13
takeover protection will reduce the manager’s private benefits–-I make no 
assumptions about ∆V.  If antitakeover protection benefits shareholders–-due, for 
instance, to increased bargaining power for the board or decreased pressure to focus 
on short-term results--∆V will be negative.  That is, a No-BV arrangement will result 
in lower cash flows.  In contrast, if the antitakeover protection reduces cash flows –-
due, for instance, to increased shirking or extraction of benefits by management--∆V 
will be positive.  The question of whether antitakeover protection enhances share 
value is therefore equivalent to the question of whether ∆V is negative. 
 
B. Efficiency-Based Explanations 
 
1. Inducement to De-concentrate Ownership 
 
Under this theory, although BV has a negative effect on shareholders when 
there is dispersed ownership, shareholders are even worse off when the company 
does not move to dispersed ownership.  Thus, under this explanation, shareholders 
prefer BV in the IPO charter at T0 because, in the event that a profitable investment 
opportunity emerges, it will encourage the firm to raise capital and to move to 
dispersed ownership at T1.31  
The value of minority shares in the company will be lower if the company 
does not move to dispersed ownership than it will be under dispersed ownership.  
In our model, the increase in value comes from the fact that the investment 
opportunity is a profitable one and the public investors share in the value of it.  
Furthermore, although we have assumed for simplicity that the manager enjoys the 
same high level of private benefits under either dispersed or concentrated 
ownership when operating under a BV arrangement, this might often not be the 
case.  the lock on control when the founders maintain a controlling block of shares is 
stronger than their lock on control under BV with dispersed ownership.  
Let us suppose that ∆V is positive.  In this case, if public investors could count 
on the company moving to dispersed ownership in the event that a profitable 
opportunity arises, they would prefer to have a No-BV arrangement, and would be 
willing to pay a higher price at the IPO for their shares under No-BV than under BV.  
                                                 
31 The analysis in this section builds on Lucian A. Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of 
Corporate Ownership and Control (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 
1999). This paper establishes that controlling shareholders might be discouraged from making 
efficient moves to dispersed ownership when such a move would reduce their private benefits 
of control.    14
Getting to dispersed ownership is not a certainty, however, and the likelihood of 
getting to dispersed ownership might depend on whether the company has chosen a 
BV arrangement. 
At  T1, the controller will clearly elect to expand if the initial arrangement 
chosen is BV.  The expansion will not reduce private benefits and will increase the 
cash flows that will be captured by the initial shareholders, including the founders.  
The expansion will increase cash flows by K + ∆K, but to raise the needed K it will be 
necessary to provide claims to cash flow in the amount of K.  Thus, the initial post-
IPO shareholders–-the founders and the shareholders purchasing shares at the IPO--
will gain an amount of ∆K, and the founders will capture a fraction (1-α) of this gain.  
In contrast, under a No-BV arrangement, the manager might elect not to 
pursue an efficient expansion opportunity if one emerges.  Under No-BV, the 
expansion will reduce private benefits by ∆B, a cost that the manager will fully bear.  
The expansion will also increase the cash flows captured by the initial shareholders 
by ∆K + ∆V, but the founders will capture only a fraction (1-α) of this increase.  
Thus, because the manager will bear the full cost of the expansion in terms of 
forgone private benefits but will not fully capture the benefits in terms of increased 
cash flows, the manager’s private interests might best be served by rejecting the 
efficient investment opportunity. This will occur if  
 
(1-α)(∆K + ∆V)- ∆B < 0 
 
or, alternatively stated, if 
 
∆K + ∆V - ∆B < [α/(1-α)] ∆B. 
 
Thus, if this condition is satisfied, the shareholders will prefer a BV 
arrangement to a No-BV arrangement even though ∆V is positive and a No-BV 
arrangement would increase the value of shares under dispersed ownership.  When 
this condition is satisfied, the company will not reach dispersed ownership if No-BV 
is chosen, and the effect of No-BV in such a case is thus irrelevant.  
In the simple model that I use, because the profit from an efficient expansion 
opportunity is fixed at ∆K, the adoption of a No-BV arrangement will either prevent 
efficient expansion or will have no effect on the likelihood of such expansion.  In a 
more general model, in which there is a distribution of possible values for ∆K, a No-
BV arrangement will prevent efficient expansion when the value of ∆K is small 
enough but not when the value of ∆K is large enough.  In such a case, the cost of a   15
No-BV arrangement is that it will reduce the likelihood of efficient expansion and a 
move to dispersed ownership.  This cost might lead buyers of shares at the IPO to 
prefer, and to be willing to pay more for, shares with a BV arrangement.  
Thus, the effect of BV arrangements on the likelihood of a subsequent move 
to dispersed ownership might make such an arrangement preferable for buyers of 
shares at the IPO stage. This could explain the adoption of BV in the IPO charter.  
Such an adoption would increase the value that buyers would be willing to pay for 
the fraction α of the shares sold, and at the same time would maintain the value of 
the founders’ block in the event that the company later moves to dispersed 
ownership.  This explanation is also consistent with the midstream opposition to BV 
arrangements.  Once a company moves to dispersed ownership, and public 
investors’ votes become important, the effect of BV on the likelihood of a move to 
dispersed ownership is irrelevant.  At this stage, as long as ∆V is negative, 
shareholders will have an incentive to vote against amendments to adopt BV 
arrangements and to attempt to remove existing BV arrangements should the 
opportunity arise. 
Assuming that this explanation accounts for the IPO adoption of BV 
arrangements, what does this tell us about antitakeover policy?  It suggests that, 
when BV arrangements are adopted at the IPO stage, they perform an efficient role 
and such adoption should be permitted and respected.  Otherwise, firms would be 
discouraged from making efficient investments that require a move to dispersed 
ownership, or would be forced to resort to less efficient alternatives such as the 
issuance of dual class stock.  At the same time, however, this explanation also 
implies that BV arrangements reduce the value of shares in companies that already 
have dispersed ownership.  Thus, BV arrangements should not be used as a default, 
and should not be imposed in midstream (as has been done by some courts and 
legislatures) on dispersed shareholders of existing companies that did not explicitly 
include such arrangements in their IPO charters.  
 
2. Efficient Rent Protection 
 
Let us now put aside the first explanation considered above and assume that 
the company will move to dispersed ownership whenever an efficient opportunity 
to expand arises.  Under an efficient rent protection theory, ∆V is assumed to be 
positive, so that the value of shares under dispersed ownership is lower with a BV 
arrangement.  However, the reduction in cash flow ∆V is smaller than ∆B, the 
increase in private benefits enjoyed by the manager under a BV arrangement.  Thus,   16
even with a move to dispersed ownership, the use of a BV arrangement is overall 
efficient.  
Under this explanation, public investors will be willing to pay less for shares 
both at the IPO stage and in the subsequent second offering stage. The founders will 
nonetheless be willing to bear this cost because the benefit to them of capturing 
higher private benefits will outweigh the costs of having a lower value attached by 
public investors to shares in the company.  
The efficient rent protection hypothesis can help explain the empirical data.  
Under this theory, we should expect founders to include antitakeover provisions in 
IPO charters because, even after “fully paying” for their higher private benefits 
enjoyed under BV arrangements, they will be better off retaining these higher 
benefits.  However, given that the effect of BV arrangements on public investors is 
negative, we would expect them to reject a move to such arrangements midstream, 
and to vote to remove them when the opportunity to do so arises.   
If BV arrangements produce an overall efficient increase in private benefits, 
one might wonder why managers of existing companies with such arrangements do 
not “bribe” shareholders to approve an antitakeover charter amendment–-i.e., offer 
to pay a certain amount to the company if the shareholders approve such an 
amendment.  One possible explanation is that managers might be concerned that 
offering to make such a side payment could be regarded as a violation of fiduciary 
duties.  Second, at later stages in the life of mature companies, managers might have 
cash constraints that prevent such a payment.  When founders reduce their 
ownership over time not by selling their own shares and keeping the proceeds, but 
rather by raising more capital for the firm through issuing more shares, the founder-
manager might not have enough cash to purchase shareholders’ consent to move to 
a BV arrangement.  
The two efficiency-based explanations thus far explored have different 
empirical implications that can provide the basis for empirical testing.  Under the 
explanation based on incentives to de-concentrate ownership, a BV arrangement has 
a positive effect on the value of public investors’ shares immediately following the 
IPO. Share value (as measured, say, by Tobin’s Q) should thus be higher for firms 
with BV provisions than for firms without such provisions.  In contrast, under the 
efficient rent protection theory, a BV arrangement has a negative effect on the value 
of public investors’ shares immediately following the IPO.  Thus, share value should 
be lower for firms with BV provisions than for firms without such provisions.   
As for policy implications, the efficient rent protection theory and the 
explanation based on incentives to de-concentrate ownership have similar 
implications.  Under the efficient rent protection explanation, because BV provisions   17
at the IPO can increase the overall pie, adopting them in the IPO should be 
permitted. In the absence of explicit charter authorization of a BV arrangement, 
however, the default arrangement should be one of No-BV.  Under the considered 
explanation, as long as public investors are not compensated for such a change, a 
move to a BV regime makes them worse off. Thus, the legal rules that imposed BV 
arrangements on shareholders of existing firms could not have been justified as an 
attempt to protect and benefit these shareholders.  
 
   C. Agency-Based Explanations 
 
Under the two explanations set forth above, the founders–-the pre-IPO 
shareholders–-benefited overall from the adoption of a BV arrangement in the IPO 
charter.  In contrast, under the set of explanations to which I now turn, such an 
adoption makes the pre-IPO shareholders worse off as a group.  Nonetheless, 
agency problems lead these shareholders to make an adoption decision that leaves 
them with a smaller pie overall.  The first such explanation focuses on agency 
problems among the firm’s founders.  The second such explanation focuses on 
agency problems between the founders and their lawyers.   
  
1. Agency Problems Among Pre-IPO Shareholders 
 
Consider a situation in which the founders of a company consist of five 
shareholders with equal holdings, all of whom are members of the same extended 
family.  One of the members manages the firm and is expected to continue to do so 
after the IPO, while the other members conduct a life of leisure and philanthropic 
activities.  In this case, the interests of the shareholder-manager, who might have a 
dominant influence on the design of the IPO, are different from – and in particular, 
are more favorable to a BV arrangement than -- the interests of the other pre-IPO 
shareholders. 32   
The reason for these divergent interests is the ability of the shareholder-
manager to capture 100% of the higher private benefits that a BV arrangement 
would produce.  In contrast, the shareholder-manager would not fully bear the costs 
of such an arrangement to the pre-IPO shareholders. These costs, which stem from 
lower future cash flow and, correspondingly, lower prices for shares sold at the IPO 
stage and at the second public offering, will be shared by all the pre-IPO 
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shareholders. The shareholder-manager would bear only twenty percent of these 
costs.  
Thus, because the shareholder-manager would capture 100% of the benefits of 
a BV arrangement to the group of pre-IPO shareholders but would bear only twenty 
percent of the arrangement’s costs to this group, the shareholder-manager might 
prefer to include this arrangement even if it would reduce the overall wealth of the 
group.  Essentially, the distortion arises from the fact that the shareholder-manager 
might ignore the external cost that the adoption of a BV arrangement may impose 
on the other pre-IPO shareholders.   
The question raised by this explanation, of course, is why the other founders 
do not prevent such an agency problem from occurring.  If a BV arrangement would 
make them worse off, why would they not prevent the shareholder-manager from 
adopting it or, alternatively, “bribe” this shareholder-manager not to do so?  The 
answer may be that the other shareholders might sometimes be passive and 
uninformed, and thus have little ability to control or monitor the decisions of the 
shareholder-manager with respect to many of the fine points of the IPO design.  
This explanation, like the others, is one under which the optimal default in 
the absence of a charter provision to the contrary is that of a No-BV arrangement.  
However, unlike the two efficiency-based explanations discussed above, this 
explanation does not imply that it is desirable to permit IPO charters to adopt BV 
arrangements.  To the extent that such arrangements are adopted due to an agency 
problem, such adoption cannot be expected to produce efficiency benefits.  
A recent study by Field and Karpoff provides evidence that is consistent with 
the considered agency problems playing a role in the IPO adoption of antitakeover 
protections. The study finds that, during the 1988-1992 period, the likelihood that a 
firm going public adopted antitakeover provisions was inversely related to the 
fraction of the pre-IPO shares held by the manager.33  The smaller this fraction, of 
course, the greater the incentive of the manager to include antitakeover provisions 
even if they are value-decreasing.  The study also finds that the likelihood of 
antitakeover provisions was positively related to various parameters that are 
correlated with greater power to the manager at the time of the IPO.34 
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2. Agency Problems Between Pre-IPO Shareholders and Lawyers 
 
Another possible agency problem could be an agency cost between the pre-
IPO shareholders and their lawyers.  In making the choice between a BV and a No-
BV arrangement, the founders may defer to the recommendation of counsel.   
Lawyers, in turn, might have distorted incentives to prefer a BV over a No-BV 
arrangement even if a No-BV arrangement would be somewhat better for the pre-
IPO shareholders.  
Founders taking their company public may elect to defer to counsel with 
respect to the choice between BV and No-BV because of their recognition that 
counsel might have superior information and expertise.  In particular, the lawyers--
with their greater expertise in advising public companies--might have better 
information about the effects of BV or No-BV arrangements down the road. 
Furthermore, lawyers might be perceived to have a better understanding of the 
effect of BV or No-BV arrangements on the price that public investors would be 
willing to pay for shares. Indeed, recent empirical evidence indicates that counsel is 
likely to have significant influence on the design of charter at the IPO stage.35  
The fact that founders may defer to lawyers’ superior information creates a 
potential for agency costs.  The very reason why founders might wish to rely on the 
lawyers’ recommendation implies that founders will not be able to fully monitor 
whether lawyers are giving them the right recommendation (one that reflects the 
lawyers’ undistorted judgment). Because lawyers have some discretion, the lawyers’ 
own incentives might influence the recommendation they ultimately provide.36 
Lawyers’ incentives point toward favoring BV over No-BV.  The reason for 
this is that lawyers can expect to feel the costs of a No-BV arrangement more than its 
benefits.  As to costs, a No-BV choice means a greater likelihood that down the road, 
the company will be taken over and the lawyer will lose a valuable client.   
Furthermore, the lawyer may suffer reputational costs as a result of its client being 
                                                 
35 See Coates, supra note 1. See also Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559 (2002).  
36 This problem is not unlimited, however.  The lawyers can only affect the decision of the 
founders within a range of reasonable options.  Each client will have a set of reasonable 
options—-likely those most often utilized in the market—-between which they cannot 
distinguish.  It is among these indistinguishable options that lawyers can influence decisions, 
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taken over without difficulty.  If managers find themselves without takeover 
defenses, they might well blame their lawyers.  
In contrast, the benefits of a No-BV arrangement, which stem from a slightly 
higher IPO price, may not be visible and, more important, are unlikely to be 
attributed to the lawyer if visible.  The founders are not going to observe the extra 
value obtained by the use of a No-BV arrangement.  And, in any event, the 
professional assessment of the lawyers’ work is unlikely to be much affected by the 
IPO price.  
To illustrate this point consider a situation in which, for whatever reason, 
both  BV and No-BV arrangements have become viewed as conventional and 
standard, and each type of arrangement is used by a substantial fraction of the 
companies going public.  At this point, we can expect to see tipping in the direction 
of increased use of BV arrangements, because lawyers would have less to lose from 
recommending a BV arrangement than from recommending a No-BV arrangement.  
The evidence is consistent with this analysis.  In the early 1990s, there were a 
substantial number of IPO firms that included antitakeover provisions in their 
charter, but also a substantial number of firms that did not.37  According to a study 
by Coates, firms elected to adopt BV arrangements in their charter provisions at 
increasing rates throughout the 1990s; by the end of the decade, a great majority of 
IPO charters had adopted staggered boards.38  
Coates views this trend as evidence of an agency problem that differs from 
the one on which I focus.39  In his view, the adoption of a BV arrangement at the IPO 
stage was good for pre-IPO shareholders, and the reason why some firms did not 
adopt BV arrangements was that their lawyers were not doing their job well.  Over 
time, even bad lawyers caught up and learned to serve their clients well by adopting 
BV arrangements.  The evidence, however, is also consistent with a different 
account. Under the account considered in this section, pre-IPO shareholders were 
best served by not including a BV arrangement, and lawyers deviated from their 
clients’ interests when they recommended BV rather than when they recommended 
No-BV. Over time, lawyers increasingly switched to recommending a BV 
arrangement since this was the safest route for them--it produced the smallest 
likelihood that their clients would complain about the legal advice they received.  
Finally, I should note that the policy implications of this account are similar to 
those of the first agency-based explanation.  Like the first explanation, this 
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explanation implies not only that No-BV is the best default arrangement, but also 
that the adoption of BV charter provisions does not necessarily imply that they will 
produce efficiency benefits and thus should be permitted.  
 
D. Information-Based Theories 
 
1.  Asymmetric Information 
 
Under this explanation, it is common knowledge among founders and public 
investors at the IPO stage that, in the event the company converts to dispersed 
ownership, a BV arrangement would be inefficient compared with a No-BV 
arrangement.  However, while both founders and public investors have the same 
information about the identity of the efficient arrangement, founders have some 
private information about the magnitude of the benefits to them and the costs to 
public investors of the BV arrangement.  In a model developed in a companion 
piece, I show that such asymmetry of information might lead founders to adopt 
inefficient provisions at the IPO stage.40  
To appreciate the intuition, consider the following numerical example.   
Suppose that firms going public sell thirty percent of their shares, and that such 
firms are equally likely to be either of high-value type H, or low-value type L.  
Founders know their firm’s type but public investors do not.  H and L firms differ in 
the likelihood of having an investment opportunity that will lead them to move to 
dispersed ownership.  For simplicity, suppose that H firms have a 100% likelihood 
and L firms have a 10% likelihood of facing such an opportunity.  Suppose also that, 
when an opportunity emerges, it will be sufficiently profitable that the founder-
manager will pursue it under either a BV or a No-BV arrangement.  Finally, suppose 
that a No-BV arrangement will be less efficient (i.e., ∆V > ∆B).41 
Even though investors know that a No-BV arrangement is efficient for both H 
and L firms, it can be shown that an efficient pooling equilibrium–-one in which 
both types of firms go public with a No-BV arrangement–-might not exist.  In such 
                                                 
40 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Asymmetric Information and the Choice of Corporate Governance 
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an equilibrium, public investors, unable to distinguish between H and L types, will 
pay the average value to them of a No-BV arrangement.  As a result, founders with 
H firms are not fully capturing the value of the cash flows they confer on public 
investors by adopting a No-BV arrangement and forgoing their private benefits 
under  BV.  Consequently, founders with an H firm would have an incentive to 
deviate from the efficient equilibrium.  They would have an incentive to be willing 
to accept a somewhat lower price at the IPO stage but have a BV arrangement.  This 
incentive to deviate would prevent an efficient pooling equilibrium. 
Indeed, under some conditions, the unique equilibrium is one of inefficient 
pooling in which all founders choose to go public with an inefficient BV 
arrangement.  L firms would have an incentive to follow the H firms and pool with 
them in the offering of BV arrangements.  Even though a BV arrangement is less 
valuable for founders with L firms, such founders will wish to avoid being 
identified by IPO investors as an L firm with a lower value. 
Thus, the asymmetric information explanation may indicate why IPO firms 
might adopt BV arrangements that shareholders oppose in midstream.  An 
inefficient pooling might arise at the IPO stage; at the midstream stage, however, 
shareholders would have no reason to vote for BV arrangements that they know to 
be inefficient.   
To the extent that BV arrangements adopted at the IPO stage are explained by 
the considered model, the policy implications are similar to those of the agency-
based explanations.  Under the considered model, No-BV is the optimal default 
arrangement.  Furthermore, it might be beneficial not to allow opting into BV at the 
IPO stage.  A prohibition on such opting-in might move the equilibrium from an 
inefficient pooling equilibrium--in which all firms offer BV--to an efficient pooling 
equilibrium in which all firms offer No-BV; and both H and L firms will benefit from 
such a move.  
 
2. Bounded Attention and Imperfect IPO Pricing 
 
a. Bounded Attention at the IPO Stage 
 
Bounded attention arises at the IPO stage when rational buyers do not have 
unlimited informational and computational capacities.42  As such, potential buyers 
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only take into account aspects of the company that are sufficiently salient or 
important, and other aspects that may have some effect on value are simply not 
factored into the estimates of value formed by the buyers.43 
Under the bounded attention explanation of BV arrangements, IPO buyers do 
not pay attention to the particular choices that companies make among a range of 
conventional takeover arrangements.  IPO buyers might pay attention to some 
unconventional arrangements or to the adoption of dual-class structure but, as long 
as the company retains a one-share, one-vote structure, the nuances of takeover 
provisions are not given weight.  
One reason for paying no attention to such nuances is that there is inherently 
a large degree of uncertainty regarding firms that go public.  Such firms have not 
been subject to the scrutiny and valuation of the market prior to the IPO.  Potential 
IPO buyers thus might concentrate their efforts on assessing the business prospects 
of the firm going public.   
Furthermore, takeover arrangements might be less important at the IPO stage 
because their effects on shareholders are not immediately relevant.  Whether BV will 
become relevant for shareholders in the future depends on the probability of a move 
to dispersed ownership.  And the adoption of BV will impact shareholders only if 
and when such a move occurs down the road.  
Indeed, at road shows, buyers tend not to inquire about the fine details of 
firms’ corporate charters, so long as those details fall within the established set of 
arrangements.  Buyers do not inquire--and indeed might not even bother to check--
whether, say, shareholders can act by written consent, or how quickly shareholders 
can call a special meeting. 
Assuming that IPO buyers do not pay attention to differences among 
takeover arrangements within a certain set of conventional arrangements, founders 
have an incentive to gravitate toward the arrangements in this set that protect them 
most from takeovers.  Because founders benefit from such arrangements in terms of 
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expected private benefits of control, it would be rational for them to adopt whatever 
takeover protections will not cost them in terms of the IPO price.  The gravitation 





Why would shareholders who pay little attention to certain antitakeover 
provisions in IPO charters vote against them in midstream?  One important reason 
is that, in midstream voting, the issue comes to shareholders in isolation.  In the IPO 
stage, potential buyers have many aspects and dimensions of the company to look 
at.  In contrast, when faced with a vote on a charter amendment to establish a 
staggered board or on a precatory resolution to de-stagger the board, the only 
question that shareholders face is whether a staggered board is good for them.   
Standing in isolation, this question is salient.  
Furthermore, at the IPO stage, potential buyers might act on the presumption 
that, even though conventional antitakeover provisions have a negative expected 
effect, the effect is not sufficiently significant for them to try to assess its magnitude 
and factor it into their decision whether to buy shares at the IPO.  In contrast, when 
shareholders face a voting decision, the recognition that the effect of conventional 
antitakeover provisions is negative, even if small, is sufficient to lead to a nay vote. 
It is also worth noting that midstream votes on such questions often come at a 
stage in which the issue of takeover bids already has more practical significance.  
Unlike a BV arrangement in a charter at the IPO stage, the effects of a BV 
arrangement on share price are likely to be directly felt by shareholders by the time 
a vote on the issue occurs, since the company has already moved to dispersed 
ownership and the negative effects of BV in terms of entrenchment are thus 
relevant.  The significant discounting for time and the probability of moving to 
dispersed ownership that might have rendered BV non-salient at the IPO stage are 
no longer an issue. 
Suppose that, if investors were to focus on the subject at the time of the IPO, 
they would estimate that, in the event the IPO company moves to dispersed 
ownership down the road, having a BV arrangement would reduce their share value 
by 1%. The discount of this difference for the time and probability that the company 
will move to dispersed ownership, along with the fact that other factors are more 
relevant to an assessment of the IPO value, might cause IPO buyers to pay little 
attention to the choice between BV and No-BV arrangements.  However, when the 
same shareholders hold shares in existing companies with dispersed ownership,   25
they can be expected to vote against BV in any votes on charter amendments or 
precatory resolutions.  
Thus, because midstream voting is not afflicted with bounded attention 
problems, the bounded attention explanation is consistent with the persistent 
midstream voting against BV.  This pattern can be explained by the fact that, in 
midstream, the issue of antitakeover provisions comes to a vote in isolation from 
other issues.  Voting against a provision thus requires no more than a qualitative 
judgment that its impact is negative.  
 
c. Investment Bankers  
 
A common argument is that the presence of underwriters protects buyers of 
stock at IPOs and provides them with a reliable signal concerning the quality of the 
initial charter’s provisions.44  According to this argument, the underwriter will have 
an incentive both to study the charter’s proposed provisions and to bargain for the 
optimal provision.  The underwriter, as it were, will represent the interests of the 
buyers of stock.  As explained below, however, the existence of underwriters cannot 
be expected to prevent the inclusion of conventional but inefficient provisions to 
which buyers do not pay attention.45 
To examine this argument in our context, suppose that founders take a 
company public and that they must decide whether to include a charter provision 
BV that, in the event that the company moves to dispersed ownership down the 
road, would have an adverse effect of 1% on the firm’s cash flows.  Furthermore, 
suppose that buyers cannot be expected to pay attention to this issue in their IPO 
purchase decisions.  Would the presence of an underwriter, which we can assume 
knows the effect of BV, lead the founders to exclude BV from the company’s 
charter? 
The answer is no, because the underwriter would have no incentive to 
prevent the inclusion of BV.  In examining the underwriter’s incentives, researchers 
have suggested two reasons why the underwriter might care about the 
shareholders’ interests.  First, the underwriter commits itself to purchasing the 
shares if the public does not, and this commitment gives the underwriter an 
incentive to make the stock more appealing to the public.  But if, by hypothesis, 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, University of Virginia Law 
Review. 
45 The discussion below draws on Bebchuk, Freedom of Contract and the Corporation, supra 
note 43.    26
public investors do not pay attention at the IPO stage to the effects of BV, the 
inclusion of BV would not affect the salability of the stock, and therefore the 
u n d e r w r i t e r  w o u l d  h a v e  n o  r e a s o n  t o  o b j e c t  t o  i t .   T h a t  i s ,  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  t h e  
underwriter--as far as the underwriting commitment is concerned--is solely to cater 
to the market’s demand that is based on the potential buyers’ information.  The 
underwriter’s interest does not lie in acting on the basis of its own superior 
information concerning the long-run effects of a BV arrangement. 
Second, it is often said that the underwriter has a valuable reputation, and 
that the underwriter would defend the interests of buyers of stock to prevent 
damage to its reputation.  Whether this reputational element would provide the 
underwriter with an incentive to oppose BV, however, is far from clear.  The 
presence of a reputable underwriter only guarantees to buyers that charter 
provisions are not misleading or value-reducing in some unconventional, hidden 
ways.  The reputable underwriter’s presence does not guarantee that the charter 
excludes non-optimal but conventional provisions.  
 
F. Private vs. Social Optimality  
 
Before concluding my exploration of possible explanations for the observed 
patterns, I should note one factor that might well be at work but that cannot explain 
the observed combination of IPO and midstream behavior.  There is literature 
showing that socially inefficient restrictions on control contests might be adopted at 
the IPO because such restrictions might impose a negative externality on outside 
bidders.46  Because such bidders are not “at the table” during the IPO, designers of 
the IPO charter have no reason to take their interests into account.  Although 
extracting a higher premium from outside bidders would be merely a transfer from 
a social point of view, it would be desirable from the private perspective of the 
target’s shareholders.  Thus, shareholders might prefer a socially undesirable 
arrangement that inefficiently reduces the likelihood of a takeover but raises premia.  
It follows that, on the margin, shareholders prefer to restrict takeovers more than is 
socially optimal.  
                                                 
46 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory 
of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ. 42, 43 (1980); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework 
for Analyzing Legal Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1073, 1073 (1990); Lucian A. 
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Corporate Ownership 55, 55 (Randall M. Morck, ed. 2000).   27
The above analysis implies that, even if standard antitakeover provisions 
were desired by shareholders, there would be possible grounds for not permitting 
some such provisions.  The evidence, however, indicates that shareholders do not in 
fact prefer to have these provisions.  If the effect of these provisions on expected 
future premia were sufficient to make them desirable for shareholders, shareholders 
of existing companies would not systematically oppose the midstream adoption of 
such provisions.  Opposition of these shareholders indicates that they do not judge 
the effect of these provisions on surplus extraction from bidders sufficient to make 
them beneficial overall for shareholders.  
While the externality point cannot by itself explain the pattern under 
consideration, it is relevant to the discussion of policy implications.  My analysis 
abstracts from effects on bidders and, as will be discussed below, still reaches a 
skeptical position toward complete contractual freedom to adopt antitakeover 
arrangements.  Because the externality issue suggests an additional social cost of 
such arrangements, it reinforces this position.  
 
E.  IPO Firms with Private Equity Funding 
 
In an article focusing on the adoption of antitakeover charter provisions by 
IPO firms backed by private equity funding, Michael Klausner questions whether 
the explanations I put forward in this paper are applicable to such firms, and he also 
proposes an explanation that in his view can account for the behavior of such 
firms.47 As I discuss below, however, the explanation that Klausner puts forward is 
one that in fact has to rely on one of the explanations that I put forward. 
Klasuner questions whether my explanations are applicable to VC-backed 
IPO firms (i.e., firms that received earlier funding from one or more venture capital 
firms) on grounds that, when such firms go public, their founder-manager 
commonly holds a minority of the shares and the venture capitalist(s) hold a 
majority of the shares. In such circumstances, the explanation based on inducement 
to de-concentrate ownership is indeed inapplicable because the company is 
expected not to have a controlling block once the VC(s) unload their shares in the 
market, which they commonly do before too long.  
Klasuner argues, however, that the explanations based on efficient rent 
protection and asymmetric information are also inapplicable to VC-backed IPO 
firms. These explanations assume that those making the decision whether to adopt a 
BV-arrangement take into account the arrangement’s effect on the manager’s private 
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benefits of control. But, Klausner argues, when a VC holds a majority of shares in 
the IPO firm, the manager who is going to obtain private benefits of control does not 
have a decisive say over IPO design.  
In Klausner’s view, the reason why VC firms permit the inclusion of 
antitakeover arrangements even though they will not directly share any part of 
management’s private benefits of control is that they wish to maintain their 
reputation of “management-friendly.” Having a reputation of treating well 
management, especially successful management, in turn helps VCs attract firms in 
which they could invest. To incorporate this element in the simple model, we need 
to add a venture capital financing stage, TVT, that comes before T0, the time in which 
the firm goes public. According to the proposed story, when the founder-manager 
and the VC contract at TVT, the VC makes an implicit commitment, backed by the 
VC’s reputation, to permit the founder-manager to adopt a BV-arrangement in the 
fortunate event that the firm end sup going public. Having a reputation for acting in 
this way is supposed to help the VC attract a deal flow and compete with other VCs. 
The reputation argument can explain why the VC can at TVT make its 
commitment implicit rather than in a legally binding form. Black and Gilson argue 
that, being repeat players, VC’s are able to make various understandings they have 
with managers implicit, enforced only by a reputational sanction.48 But this still 
leaves the question of what implicit commitments will be optimal for a VC to make 
at TVT.  
Standard and familiar reasoning suggests that, at TVT, a VC will have an 
incentive to make implicit commitments only to actions down the road that can be 
expected to increase rather than decrease the expected joint surplus of the parties. 
Suppose that, in the event of an IPO, adopting a BV-arrangement will produce an 
overall benefit of $100 million to the manager and an overall loss of $50 million to 
the VC. In such a case, the VC will have an incentive to commit at TVT to permit a 
BV-arrangement should the company go public later on even though at that stage a 
BV-arrangement would produce a loss of $50 million to the VC.  
Having such an implicit commitment, however, would not be in the parties’ 
and the VC’s interest if it is expected that, in the event of an IPO, adopting a BV-
arrangement will produce an overall benefit of $100 million to the manager and an 
overall loss of $200 million to the VC. In such a case, a commitment to permit a BV-
arrangement in the event of an IPO would in fact reduce the parties’ expected joint 
surplus from the transaction.  
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Thus, the introduction of VC reputation and commitment is not by itself 
sufficient to explain the adoption of BV-arrangements by VC-backed IPO firms. One 
needs in addition to explain why adopting a BV-arrangement thinking about them 
as a group at T=0, the joint interest of the parties would be served by having 
antitakeover provisions. It is only in this case that VC would have an incentive to 
maintain a reputation of allowing BV arrangements at the IPO stage.  
What can explain why VC(s) and the manager – the pre-IPO shareholders– 
will be made better off as a group by adopting a BV-arrangement at the IPO stage? 
The possible explanations are those that my analysis has identified. A BV-
arrangement could be in the interest of the pre-shareholders as a group under the 
efficient rent protection explanation, the asymmetric information explanation, or the 
bounder attention explanation. In short, rather than being inapplicable to the VC-
backed firm context, the explanations I put forward are an essential complement to 
the reputational story Klausner seeks to use for explaining why VC’s are willing to 
go along with BV-arrangements when they have considerable say over IPO design.     
 
III. CONCLUSION  
 
While IPO firms have increasingly been adding antitakeover provisions tot 
heir charters, shareholders of existing companies have increasingly been voting in 
opposition to such charter provisions. This paper identifies and analyzes possible 
explanations for this empirical pattern. The explanations that have been developed 
can provide a basis for future empirical work and policy analysis in this area.  
 